Dr. Cliff Mboya is an Africa-China analyst. His research interests include Geopolitics, Public diplomacy (Belt and Road Initiative, FOCAC, BRICS). He is currently a Postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for Africa-China studies (CACS) at the University of Johannesburg. He worked as the Africa editor and consultant for the China-Africa project; the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi as public affairs officer and interned at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya. He earned his PhD in International Politics from Fudan University (China).
BRI
Could you please introduce the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Digital Silk Road, and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative, and explain their connections and distinctions?
The BRI (formally One Belt, One Road-OBOR) is China’s geopolitical and geo-economic initiative that seeks to recreate the historic Silk Road trade route during the westward expansion of China’s Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE). The original Silk Road forged trade networks throughout what are today the Central Asian countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as modern-day India and Pakistan to the south. Those routes extended more than four thousand miles to Europe. China’s lofty ambition to revive its ancient Silk Road trading routes is now becoming a reality.
President Xi Jinping announced the BRI in September 2013 in Kazakhstan and declared that it will be his major foreign policy initiative under his administration. It was conceived to open up the world market and establish a trade and investment network spanning the three continents of Africa, Asia, and Europe to facilitate greater global growth and development. It is a modern and ambitious project intended to put China at the center of a global network of land, maritime and digital connectivity conducive for a China centric global economic and political order. It has become a strategic avenue and launching pad for greater Chinese influence and expansion across the globe. Its core pillars are facilitating connectivity, financial integration, unimpeded trade, promotion of policy coordination and people-to-people bonds. It is designed to expand China’s geo-economic and geo-political integration by influencing strategic global supply chains and redirecting the flow of international trade through access to critical sea-lanes and seaports.
The BRI was initially based on 65 countries and about 60% of the world’s population extending from China to Europe through central Asia on the Silk and Economic Belt and to South East Asia, Middle East and Africa through the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. While these countries and regions formed the basis of the BRI, it was later made open to all nations willing to be part of the project for the enhancement of trade and investment with China. As of August 2023, 155 countries were listed as having signed up to the BRI. The participating countries represent more than half of the world’s GDP and nearly 75% of its population.
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) is the sea route element of the BRI. It connects the Middle East and Africa and it is dominated by investments in ports and rail network. It is intended to expand the maritime economy through sea lines of communication and establish a strategic partnership in the South China Sea, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Beyond the blue economy passages, the MSRI also serves as China’s power projection tool in line with its great power status.
The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is the technology dimension of the BRI and encompasses all things technology related. It was announced in a 2015 white paper and features components spanning digital services, cross-border e-commerce, smart cities, telemedicine, and internet finance as well as initiatives to accelerate tech transfer, tech progress through big data, artificial intelligence, block chain, and quantum computing etc. It represents China’s approach and vision for a new global technological order where China plays a prominent role as an alternative to western dominance and digital governance. China is actively building digital infrastructure and leveraging digital opportunities in developing countries enhancing its digital footprint, setting standards and digital governance norms that enhance its technological leadership.
In sum, the MSRI and the DSR are critical elements of the BRI and together they form part of Beijing’s overall strategic geo-economic and geo-political strategy towards a greater influence in global governance and leadership. They are only distinct to the extent that they focus on specific areas and components in the overall grand strategy.
BRI and Technology
Compared to similar initiatives like the EU's Global Gateway initiative, does the BRI have a competitive edge, in Africa and/or other areas?
Yes it does. China’s BRI, unlike the EU’s Global Gateway initiative has already delivered significant infrastructure development across Africa, and the continent has a more positive view of the BRI. Despite recent concerns related to debt sustainability, the BRI has delivered roads, ports, railways, power plants, digital centres, and tech services. Some examples include the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR and the Lamu Port in Kenya, the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, the Abuja-Kaduna Railway in Nigeria, Maputo-Katembe bridge in Mozambique, Egypt’s new administrative capital and data centres in Senegal, Madagascar, Togo and Zambia among other African countries.
Challenging China’s infrastructure and digital dominance in Africa will be a hard task for the EU in light of the enormous breadth of Chinese investments over the decade that has given Beijing a competitive edge. Moreover, the EU’s Global Gateway initiative commitment is seen as a counter-measure to China’s BRI rather than a genuine attempt to promote actual development in Africa. The difference lies in the implementation of the two initiatives.
Do you think the BRI has become more technology-focused? For instance, has there been a shift in BRI's investment priorities towards technology, in Africa and/or other areas?
Yes: The BRI was previously associated with physical mega scale and capital-intensive projects like railways, ports, power plants and roads infrastructure. However, in recent years, Chinese lenders and companies are now focusing more on smaller initiatives related to technology, renewable energy, and connectivity. Xi Jinping set forth the new path for the BRI when he warned against “vanity projects” and encouraged Chinese lenders and companies to prioritise “small and beautiful” projects. The new narrative is about open, green and clean BRI projects in response to economic and environmental challenges associated with physical infrastructure projects.
As a result, China has stepped up its DSR initiative to the top of its priority list in BRI countries. Recent BRI projects in Africa are dominated by investments in ICT infrastructure like fibre optic connectivity, Huawei’s 5G connectivity, smart city systems and human capacity building towards Chinese technology and standards. The focus is now on scientific and technological cooperation to promote innovation and adoption of Chinese technology and China’s global tech governance.
How is China's technological investment in Africa perceived by African countries?
In majority of the African countries, China’s tech investments are seen as necessary and welcomed. They are seen as important precursors to digital development and supporting various sectors like health, governance, financial services, entertainment and job creation. Chinese technological investment is increasingly going hi-tech and permeating all aspects of life to a point where they have become indispensable and African countries have come to perceive China as the go to for cheap and quick technology adoption and implementation.
What impact has China's (digital) technological investment had on Africa countries?
China’s tech investments in Africa have upgraded and enhanced Africa’s digital economies and growth. In line with the Digital Silk Road, Chinese companies such as Huawei, ZTE, Tencent, Alibaba and China Telecom have invested heavily in digital infrastructure and promoted digitization of services enhancing efficiency in various sectors of the economy. Huawei is responsible for more than 50% of Africa’s 3G networks and 70% of its 4G networks. Together with other Chinese companies, they are responsible for hundreds of digital projects ranging from telecommunication networks, data centers, cloud services, smart city projects as well as digital talent development. The huge investments have also led to China’s domination of Africa’s digital infrastructure and spaces leading to concerns about digital sovereignty.
How has China's (digital) technology development (such as Huawei, TikTok, AI) affected Africa (if there is an influence)?
China’s digital technology development has affected Africa in several ways. The rise of Huawei, Tik Tok, We Chat, Alibaba among others has inspired a new generation of tech ensuthiasts and liberated the global tech order inspiring young Africans to embrace diversity and the possibility of acquiring skills and potential to contextualize new tech to suit local culture, environments and tastes. They has demystified long held perceptions of Chinese tech as ‘poor quality, malign and unreliable’.
How might the economic and technological confrontation between China and the United States (e.g., economic and financial sanctions on China, Huawei ban, TikTok ban) affect Africa?
The tech wars and competition between China and the U.S is detrimental to the diffusion and uptake of tech and innovation in Africa and denies Africa the diversity and options required to leverage the strengths of each side for the better of the continent. The zero-sum mentality puts pressure on African countries to choose between Chinese or American tech. Nonetheless, the economic sanctions on China and the Huawei ban initially raised concern in the continent, however, African countries continued to place trust on China and its tech companies and with the lack of alternative and cheaper options, decided to maintain and even enhance tech cooperation with Chinese companies.
In the context of the US-China tech confrontation, how do you think Africa's policy (for example, the policy of Kenya) decisions regarding the Huawei ban reflect their national interests and political autonomy?
Before the China-U.S tech confrontation and the rise of Chinese tech investments on the continent, the sector was dominated by U.S and western firms and there was little choice and alternatives. However, China has provided alternatives giving Africa a choice between U.S tech and Chinese tech. The fact that African countries, including Kenya rejected America’s calls for boycott or ban Huawei, shows a degree of political autonomy and policy based on national interest rather than foreign interests. Statements by some policy makers in Africa regarding digital sovereignty and freedom to choose reflect a desire and commitment to political autonomy.
Moreover, policy choices seem to follow not just security concerns but also the development levels of countries and their ability to offset losses resulting from restrictions on Huawei. While many developed economies have banned or restricted Huawei from their 5G networks, developing countries, heavily dependent on Huawei for their ICT and technological advancement through cloud infrastructure and e-government services, are finding it difficult to follow suit based on their own national interests.
What key factors prompt Kenya to continue using Huawei equipment and technology despite US pressure?
Kenya and Chinese company Huawei have engaged in extensive and expensive collaboration in various digital and technological sectors. Huawei is at the heart of Kenyan’s technological drive. Its considerable investments in the country cover digital infrastructure, equipment and training in its ICT academy programmes. Huawei oversees the implementation of the National Optic Fibre Backbone Infrastructure Extension Project (NOFBI) that will link 47 counties in Kenya. The project is part of Kenya’s Vision 2030 national plan to establish “technology-intensive and high-tech industries in ICT, biotechnology and e-commerce.
In considering the salience of Huawei in propelling Kenya’s ICT development, the benefit to Kenya of Huawei’s facilitation of access to high-quality, affordable digital infrastructure and services far outweighs the cost of the ban. A cost-benefit analysis of the US’s Huawei ban shows that without alternative investments and services, it is not in the interest of Kenya to heed US calls to shun Huawei and its services.
As technological investments and influence from China and the US increase in Africa, how do you view the impact on the diplomatic posture of African countries (for example, Kenya)? In this global technological confrontation, how should African countries balance their relationships with China and the US?
African countries should engage both the U.S and China primarily based on their own national interests rather than get caught up in the technological confrontation between the two powers. Africa agency and political autonomy must be emphasised to avoid being used as pawns to serve the interests of either power at the expense of the continent’s development priorities. Africa’s tech drive must not be framed from the U.S and China divide but from a need assessment. U.S security concerns should be analysed critically to determine how they align with Africa’s digital sovereignty concerns while at the same time prioritise the acquisition of these technologies to drive essential services and avoid a zero-sum mentality in the engagements.
If African countries (for example, Kenya) complies with the US demands to ban Huawei equipment and technology, what specific impacts do you foresee on Kenya's ICT development and digital economy?
Against this backdrop, there has rightly been concern in the country since the US ban on Huawei over the economic costs to Kenya of severing ties with Huawei. The lack of alternatives from the U.S means that severing ties would seriously disrupt digital services across all the major sectors of the economy from e-government, financial services e-banking, e –commerce, health, agriculture etc. It would literally set Kenya back almost a decade in ICT development and the cost of uprooting the infrastructure and equipment laid by Huawei in Kenya would be enormous. It would occasion huge job losses amongst the youth, who are heavily invested in e-commerce businesses, tech support and maintenance and generally in the technology and digital ecosystem in Kenya.
In such a scenario, does Kenya have alternative solutions to fill the void left by Huawei's exit?
There are very few alternative solutions because of Huawei’s outsized role in Kenya’s ICT sector. Most alternatives would probably come from U.S and Western firms but they would be restrictive in terms of cost, range and depth but they would not be able to completely fill the massive void that would be left by Huawei in the short term. For instance, digital mobile banking platform M-Pesa has more than 50 million users processing more than $314 billion in transactions annually, and it recently has been migrated to Huawei’s Mobile Money Platform. Replacing Huawei’s infrastructure and digital networks in the country would be very disruptive and the U.S has not shown any commitment towards filling the void if Huawei exited.
Russia- Ukraine War
How do you view the impact of the Ukraine war on China-Africa relations?
The Ukraine war has indirectly affected China-Africa relations in terms of views on global governance and the rules based order. While African countries widely condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they were hesitant to support Western efforts to isolate Russia that don’t take account of African interests. They disagreed on talking a tougher stance on Russia including the use of sanctions and mostly aligned with China’s views and suggestions on global governance and rules based order based on some values that they share. To an extent, the continent rejected Western domination of global affairs and the “coercive diplomacy”, hypocrisy and double standards that has characterized Africa’s relationship with the West seeking to have a more prominent role and debate that includes the views of China and other developing countries.
For African countries frustrated by and wary of Western paternalism, a resurgent China and Russia creates the possibility of a multipolarity that could open up geopolitical opportunities for Africa. Despite the lack of a common African position on diplomatic and security matters, China will most likely build on the momentum generated by the Ukraine crisis to push for reforms in the U.N. Security Council and the international order broadly, while seeking to erode the West’s dominance in International affairs.
The presence of large populations of Muslims across Africa has drawn parallel to the perceived Western indifference to the humanitarian crisis in the Middle East as well as Palestine, when contrasted with the compassion extended towards Ukrainian refugees. China is the biggest winner in the debate as it consolidates influence and convergence around issues related to global economic and political order and its credibility has been enhanced around the same issues.
The war in Ukraine may bolster China’s Global Security Initiative that is being actively promoted in the continent under the premise of converging security interests. The initiative touts familiar principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the right to self-determination, rejecting double standards as well as building an effective and sustainable security architecture. This suggests that African countries that are not in good standing with the West will possibly be drawn into a security alliance with China.
What role has China played in shaping the stance of African countries on the Ukraine war?
China managed to bolster African support for its stance on the Ukraine conflict by leveraging African concerns about the global order to converge their positions with Beijing’s, in ways the West appears blind to. After a recent meeting with several African foreign ministers, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that there was a broad consensus on several issues including agreeing that “there are more than two options, namely war and sanctions, for dealing with international and regional hotspot issues, but dialogue and negotiation is the fundamental solution, which should be adhered to under the current situation.” Wang added that all countries have the right to autonomous decision-making and should not be forced to choose sides in a competition between global powers. “We should resist the Cold War mentality and oppose confrontation between camps,” he said. These comments were intended to distinguish China—with its famous “non-interference” principle—from Western countries that have ramped up pressure on African countries to condemn Russia more forcefully, and indeed, much of the various African reactions since the outbreak of war in Ukraine suggests that continental opinions diverge sharply from Western ones.
Power
From the perspective of international relations, has the balance of power in China-Africa relations shifted? Also, has the concept of power changed? Specifically, in the context of the US-China confrontation, the Ukraine war, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian/Gaza conflict, has the definition and focus of power changed—for example, from hard power to soft power in public diplomacy, to new types of power? Has China utilized new forms of power in its technological deployments and public diplomacy?
The balance of China between China and Africa has significantly shifted in Africa as Chinese engagement and investments intensify on the continent. China has grown to become the largest investor and trade partner for majority of African countries and probably the most influential and consequential actor diplomatically in some of them. Furthermore, China is doubling down on its soft power initiatives in Africa as part of it’s grand strategy to tap African markets, shape global governance norms, and expand its influence.
China has deliberately and strategically tried to distinguished itself from other powers by emphasising soft power in its engagement with Africa. The concept of power has changed from “hard-power” that featured prominently between powerful states and weak states in Africa to a focus on “soft-power” thanks to the alternative offered by China that has freed many developing countries from coercion and intimidation in the international security arena. Influence is determined more by the ability to persuade and collaborate with developing countries in Africa rather than the ability to coerce or threat the use of force altering the whole concept of power. Its emphasis on equality, mutual respect and non-interference has worked to its advantage and influenced policy positions and influence on the continent. At the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) Congress in October 2017, President Xi Jinping called it “soft power with Chinese characteristics.”
China’s growing ability to advance its strategic interests through cooption, cooperation, and inducements has increased its power potential as evidenced in the war Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where it enjoys a moral advantage based on the rhetoric behind western hypocrisy and double standards.
China’s Image Building
How is China's image perceived in Africa, particularly regarding the BRI and technology?
China’s image in Africa about BRI and Technology has significantly improved over the years. China’s initial re-entry into the continent at the beginning of the millennium was received with a lot of scepticism but it has managed to work on its image building consistently making positive returns since the BRI was initiated in 2013. The BRI has actually been one way through which China has improved its image and influence in Africa. The BRI and Tech sectors generally enjoy positive perceptions despite emerging concerns to do with debt sustainability, environmental factors as well as privacy and security concerns in the tech sector respectively. Chinese tech that was previously perceived to be inferior has come of age and Chinese brands like Huawei, Lenovo, ZTE, Tencent, Xiaomi have been embraced in the African market with significantly high reviews.
China is concerned about its image in Africa and its active response to African concerns by reducing debt towards large scale infrastructure projects to” small and green” projects as proposed by Xi Jinping will go along way in sustaining a positive image in the continent. Research by the Afrobarometer shows that the BRI significantly improves China’s image among Africans who now perceive China as an important and reliable development partner.
How could China improve its image in Africa? For instance, in your research, you mentioned Chinese companies' corporate social responsibility (CSR) and digital diplomacy. Do you think these two aspects could help China enhance its image in Africa?
China could further improve its image but enhancing its public diplomacy initiatives and people-to-people cultural and economic exchanges. The relationship is still dominated by high level state to state relations and more could be done at the level of people to people relations. Confucius Institutes and classrooms have done well to bridge the language and culture gap but it remains one directional and highly formal. Other actors other than state sanctioned actors could play a huge role to enhance China’s image among the people. For instance, Chinese companies who interact with ordinary citizens play a massive role in the communities around them through corporate social responsibility and touching the lives of ordinary people. These initiatives could be expanded at all levels of interaction to initiate genuine, long term and authentic exchanges between people and bridge the language and cultural gap.
Digital diplomacy has a crucial role to play since content and interactions can reach millions of people and cut time and distance between China and Africa. Africans and their Chinese counterparts can interact with each other through digital platforms unmediated by the state to establish personal and common relations and support formal image building initiatives at the bureaucratic level.
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