Prof. Rita Floyd (PhD, University of Warwick 2007) is Professor of International Security and Ethics in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham and co-editor-in-chief of International Affairs.
Professor Floyd is the author of countless articles and four books, including The Morality of Security: A theory of Just Securitization (2019) and The Duty to Secure: From Just to Mandatory Securitization (2024), both published with Cambridge University Press. Her latest book Teaching Security Studies is forthcoming with Edward Elgar in 2025.
This interview has been authorised for publication by Prof. Rita Floyd.
We thank you, Professor Rita Floyd for accepting our interview with the Saint Pierre International Security Center.
SPCIS: How do you view the ethical responsibilities of states in balancing national security with global security concerns?
Prof Rita: I hold that states have special and overriding duties to their own people in matters of security. The provision of security is – in line with social contract theory – the raison d’être of the state. People have relinquished certain freedoms in return for protection from the state. The provision of security for one’s own people thus ranks higher in the purview of states than that of outsiders. Alas, because not all states follow these rules and because all people possess equal moral worth, states also have duties regarding the provision of security to third parties. Duties of other-securitization (i.e. saving third parties by means of extraordinary measures) can, bar some exceptions, be overridden if they were to affect the state’s ability to provide security to their own people. The provision of security to one’s own people, however, is overriding.
SPCIS: In your book The Duty to Secure, you discuss the shift from voluntary to mandatory securitization. Could you share insights on the implications of this shift for international cooperation?
Prof Rita: That is correct. I argue that if, as I have shown in my previous book, The Morality of Security: A theory of just securitization (Cambridge University Press 2019), securitization is sometimes morally permissible (which I take to be the case when the criteria of just securitization are satisfied), it is logical to assume that securitization can also be morally required. Put differently, it is obligatory rather than voluntary. I argue that securitization is not morally required at the point when it is morally permissible but that for securitization to be obligatory, additional requirements must be satisfied. Concretely, I hold that securitization is obligatory when, in addition to just cause, right intention and proportionality, less harmful alternatives to securitizing have been tried and failed to achieve just cause. For the moral permissibility of securitization, it is ‘merely’ necessary to anticipate the ex-ante success of such alternatives to satisfy just cause and for securitization to emerge as the best option.
The discovery of morally mandatory securitization, in principle, raises the following questions: Who has such duties to third parties? Where do they come from? Why do such duties exist at all? I argue that triggers for remedial responsibility to right a wrong are - in descending order - 1) moral responsibility 2) outcome responsibility (including benefit) 3) friendship 4) capacity. The fact that I prioritise friendship over capacity has major repercussions for international cooperation. It serves to heighten the role that security communities, alliances and other ties of security friendship play. Although not all these security arrangements are set up to alleviate insecurity within states (alliances are outward looking, for example), I argue that special ties of security-friendship place greater remedial responsibility on these actors. The net effect of all this is that the role of the UNSC (which is thwarted by the veto held by its permanent members), in my theory, is reduced, while regional and sub-global bodies are rendered more important.
SPCIS: How can states ensure that their security policies align with ethical principles, especially in contexts involving cross-border issues like climate change or migration?
Prof Rita: While migration and environmental change are both new/non-traditional security issues they enjoy a very different standing in the relevant literature. Migration and the issue of societal security are at the heart of the widespread (in critical security studies) moral preference for desecuritization (i.e. not treating issues with extraordinary emergency measures but with normal political measures instead). Environmental security, and there especially the issue of global climate change, is a different proposition. Here most scholars accept that we are dealing with a real threat. Regardless of whether we talk about this issue in security terms, it is an objective threat to a whole range of valued referent objects (from polar bears to civilisation). This opens the possibility that securitization could be morally justifiable. After all the logic of desecuritization as morally superior relies on the premise that no threats need to be securitized as none are real.
I believe that the securitization (beyond mere rhetoric) of climate change at the state level will happen, which is not to suggest that I am in favour. Once the threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming is breached, some governments are likely to securitize the issue (the Scandinavian countries and Germany are prime candidates due to a comparatively high acceptance among the electorate audience of securitizing moves in this space. We can see this, for example, in Germany’s decision to abandon nuclear power). Securitization will likely take the form of the banning of carbon-intensive unnecessary behaviours (inland flights, annual holidays abroad, driving for leisure, etc.). These measures will be enforced with the help of the police. I am not suggesting here that such a securitization would be morally permissible, let alone required (see also answer to question 4), only that such securitization is likely to happen.
SPCIS: What are some challenges and opportunities you see for ethical frameworks in addressing new security threats, such as cyber threats or environmental crises?
Prof Rita: One problem with these new types of threats is that they are transboundary in nature. Among other things, this means that even if individual states securitize the climate, their efforts are unlikely to change things. This is likely to lead to protests among sections of society who will not accept that their carbon-intense ways are impermissible, whereas, across the state’s border, they are not. Moreover, there is the justified fear that securitization will lead to the economic decline of the state in question. In short, there is the risk that any state doing this will put itself at a considerable disadvantage vis-à-vis other states. Moreover, if their actions undermine other types of security, they may well fall foul of their duties under the social contract. Realistically, this means that the impetus for securitization against climate change must come from higher up, which is to say, the global level. That is, there must be a new body at the global level (e.g. attached to the wider United Nations apparatus) that monitors carbon emissions of states and punishes the breaches of targets in no uncertain terms, for example, by excluding relevant states from international sporting events, but also with targeted/smart sanctions.
SPCIS: In your experience, how can international bodies and policymakers work together to promote security in a way that respects diverse national interests and ethical standards?
Prof Rita: I don’t think I have an answer to this question because I don’t think that we are anywhere near this point. As it stands, the issue of ethical conduct in the provision of security is not often discussed. Many people (lay people and practitioners of security) seem to hold that the emergency overrides ethical concerns, at least, it would seem, when the threat is fresh and in cases where their own state is concerned. The longer securitizations go on, and/or the more innocent people (including referent objects of security) are harmed, the voices of discontent tend to grow louder. As there are no laws of securitization (notwithstanding the fact that laws can apply in various circumstances surrounding various elements of securitization), objections are often voiced in terms of ethics and immorality. For example, the eavesdropping carried out by GCHQ as revealed by the whistleblower Edward Snowden, Australia’s detention of migrants on remote Island states, and the treatment of prisoners in America’s war on terror all were deemed unethical, including by many policymakers. Not to mention what authoritarian states, including Russia under Putin, Syria under Bashar al-Assad and China under the CCP and Xi Jing Ping, do to ensure regime security. The upshot of this is that collectively, we broadly know which behaviours are ethical, and which are unethical. This also means that there is a basis from which to discuss the ethics of securitization. In other words, I think that there is space to develop a unifying ethical standard. After all, the same was done for war. The question is, how can we get the policymaking world to think in those terms?
Scholars of security have little, but still, some influence. Many of us are asked to present our research at parliamentary committees, and many work with Think Tanks and NGOs. If we show that the development of standards for ethical securitization is desirable and – albeit not yet by that name - broadly shared, then this could shape the policymaking world and, ultimately, how things are done. Naturally, some international bodies and policymakers are more susceptible to these ideas than others. The European Union, for example, which prides itself on being a good international citizen, is much more likely to be open to these ideas than other bodies. Likewise, liberal democracies are more likely to be interested than those who rule with impunity. In that sense, then, there is a range of fora where scholars can push for the adoption of these issues.
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